June 15, 2007, will mark an important milestone in public health. On this date the revised International Health Regulations [(IHR 2005)](http://www.who.int/topics/international_health_regulations/en/index.html) will come into force, with the aim of preventing national public-health emergencies from spreading internationally.

The IHR establish practices and procedures for prompt notification to WHO of global health risks. Countries are obliged to nominate a national focal point to communicate detailed public-health information to WHO, including case definitions, laboratory results, number of cases and deaths, and conditions affecting the spread of disease. WHO would then be responsible for validating whether the threat was of international concern---declaring emergencies, recommending containment measures, and coordinating an international response.

Chernobyl, Ebola virus, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome, and more recently avian influenza, have all highlighted the inadequacy of the old regulations (IHR 1969), which only required countries to raise the alarm in emergencies involving three diseases---yellow fever, plague, and cholera. Under the revised system, member states are obliged to report "any public health emergency of international concern", whether nuclear, biological, or chemical in nature, irrespective of origin.

The revised regulations are a welcome attempt to improve global health security. All 193 WHO member states have agreed to the IHR in principle and over 160 have nominated a centre to be their national focal point. But despite this promising start, turning the vision of a global public-health surveillance system into a reality presents many challenges.

Most industrialised and middle-income countries have the core capacity to meet the surveillance, diagnostic, and containment demands of the IHR, but many developing countries do not. The IHR 2005 obliges WHO and member states to collaborate in mobilising financial resources to improve their core capacity but the regulations do not include any concrete financing mechanisms. Sustained multilateral and bilateral partnerships are clearly needed for low-income countries to make progress with their capacity to detect and contain global health threats. But while overcoming the financial barriers to achieving the IHR will be difficult, overcoming political obstacles may present a more daunting task.

At this year\'s World Health Assembly (WHA), member states rejected Taiwan\'s bid to gain membership to WHO, largely because of China\'s concerns about the application. China fears that granting Taiwan WHO membership will be a step towards recognition of Taiwan as an independent state. But the greater fear should be the possibility that a public-health emergency in Taiwan could rapidly spread throughout Asia and around the world. For the IHR to work, no territory---whether Taiwan or the Occupied Palestinian Territory---can be excluded from the global surveillance system, especially in light of the threat posed by avian influenza.

In May, 2006, the WHA recognised this threat, adopting a resolution urging WHO member states to comply immediately, on a voluntary basis, with IHR 2005. But realisation of the stark health inequities that will arise in the event of a pandemic might prevent compliance. The death toll from the next influenza pandemic could reach over 62 million people worldwide, with 96% of deaths occurring in the developing world. Currently, the global production capacity of vaccines for controlling an influenza pandemic falls well short of what might be needed, and access to what can be produced will be inequitable. This situation led Indonesia to withhold its H5N1 virus samples from the 50-year-old WHO virus-sharing system, in which influenza viruses are donated by countries and flow freely to the global community for vaccine development.

At a technical briefing at the recent WHA, the Director-General of WHO, Margaret Chan, said that countries that do not share avian influenza virus would fail the IHR. Member states have a collective responsibility to ensure that this situation does not arise by helping countries to develop the capacity to control an influenza pandemic, as well as to detect and contain one. To ensure global health security, countries have to protect the wellbeing not only of their own populations but also those of fellow nations.

Realising the difficulties of IHR implementation, the international community has agreed a deadline of 2016 by which all WHO member states should be able to fully implement the regulations. Whether the technical, financial, and political barriers to this goal can be overcome by then remains to be seen. And whether global health threats, such as an avian influenza pandemic, will be neutralised is yet another disturbing uncertainty.
